F15S- 



<r<V 






i'"i'^W:.T'; i:, .. 















-^i;-,''! 












^•■i- 








b^^-o %/ ;^\ %/ :M^^. \/ ;^\ %,^^ 



..T« .'V 



:.° ^^''<^ ^^^<m\^*' .«y ^^. ".^H^." ^""^'^^ -^rw^: .^^>. 







•^v^. 






O N o 







^oV" 



^^" <... '^v """A-^ 















'•- X,^" 









^-T- 
































^. ,^ -\fX^^/,*o ^^ .V 












«7 ^^i.. - 



'•j^ (V r " ° * ^ 










Digitized by tine Internet Archive 
in 2010 witin funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/colombiantreatyOObart 



THE COLOMBIAN TREATY 



HOW THE INDEMNITY OF 

$25,000,000 

-AND MANY TIMES THAT SUM- 
WILL COME BACK IN PURCHASES OF 
SUPPLIES FOR PUBLIC WORKS, AND 
IN A GREA TL Y INCREASED GENERAL 
COMMERCE - - - 



J^l^ 



^^ 



COPYRIGHT JUNE 1921 



ri5 



,,^ 



V 



"^a 



o. 



^vi^ 



ICI.A617431 



JUN 22 1921 



THE COLOMBIAN TREATY 

By WALTER H. BARTHOLOMEW 
Assistant General Manager, Colombian Commercial Corporation 

Why has the United States Government, by its ratification of the 
Treaty with Colombia, agreed to pay to that country a total of 
$25,000,000 as an indemnity for the loss of Panama? A correct answer 
to this question makes clear our true economic and political relationship 
to Colombia, and the possibilities of future trade w^ith her. 

The loss of Panama was a great blow to Colombia, and has seriously 
interfered w^ith her prosperity and growth for eighteen years. Since the 
United States has benefited and will continue to benefit tremendously 
by what Colombia lost at Panama, it seemed — regardless of differences 
of opinion as to responsibility — only just that Colombia should be reim- 
bursed. We* profited greatly, she was appreciably injured; a balancing 
of accounts was highly desirable. Without it there could have followed 
only continued recrimination and friction. 

Let us analyze what the loss of Panama meant to Colombia. She is 
the only country in South America having a seacoast on both the 
Atlantic and the Pacific. The Panama Canal is the connecting- Uijk 
between her two seaboards. When the trans-Isthmian railroad w^as built 
prior to the digging of the Canal, Colombia reserved certain preferential 
rights in its use, besides which she was to receive $250,000 a year rental 
until 1966, w^hen the railroad was to become her property. 

Also, in the concession to the French company under the manage- 
ment of the famous De Lesseps for the construction of the canal across 
the Isthmus, Colombia reserved certain rights to the use of the canal 
for her commerce, her w^arships and her armies, and she w^as to receive 
a percentage of the tolls to be collected. It should be remembered that 
when Colombia lost Panama she lost a present income from the railroad 
and a potential income from both the railroad and the canal, the 
ultimate w^orth of w^hich can hardly be computed. And she lost as w^ell 
the right to use the canal unless she paid for it as other nations must. 

It is exactly as if Florida extended to the mainland of South America 
and a railroad had been built across it to connect the Atlantic with th^ 



Gulf of Mexico, and a canal was planned and partly constructed to 
connect these two bodies of water; and then Florida seceded, and some 
foreign nation prevented our using our army and navy to force her 
back into the Union. We would thus have our Gulf ports separated 
from our Atlantic ports, and a barrier set up w^hich would operate as 
a fatal obstacle to the free intercourse between our people. One can 
imagine the feeling which would have arisen in the United States. 

No matter w^hat our individual opinions may be as to the right of 
our Government to take the steps it did at Panama, it goes without 
saying that Colombia could easily have defeated the little province of 
Panama in a war, and thus retained possession of that valuable territory. 
This was prevented by the interference of the United States. If we 
visualize the wave of indignation which would have swept over this 
country had the same thing happened to us, we will get some idea of 
the w^ay the Colombians felt about it. 

> 

The payment of $25,000,000 to Colombia is in fact small recom- 

- pense for her actual and potential loss. Fortunately, the Treaty accords 
to Colombia certain preferential rights in the use of the Panama Canal 
and the Panama Railroad calculated to restore to her the strategic and 
commercial advantages which she lost. The Treaty specifically grants 
her the right to use the Canal on equal terms vfiih the United States, 
and opens the Canal Zone to her products free of duty. This is a 
greater benefit than at first appears, as Colombia has rich deposits of 
petroleum and coal w^hich eventually can be furnished to the ships of 
the world passing through the Canal. Also her cattle and fruits will 
find a ready market there, and it means a good deal to her merchants 
that these articles can enter the Canal Zone duty free. 

In accordance w^ith the established principles of international law, 
Panama will now^ be required to assume her just share of the national 
debt of Colombia, and this the United States, under a clause of the 
Treaty, agrees to bring about. Thus Colombia's financial burden, already 
the smallest per capita of any South American country, will be further 
lightened, probably by several million dollars, and she will have just so 
much more money available for her own development. 

Undoubtedly the Panama episode prejudiced our commercial rela- 
tions in Colombia, and what happened during the World War did not 



contribute toward alleviating the bitter feeling. Rather the reverse was 
true in some respects. Colombia, prior to 1914, did a large business 
with Europe, and had been accorded the usual courtesies and accommo- 
dations extended by England, France and Germany to their foreign 
customers. Europe being closed as a market for her products as well 
as a source of supply for manufactured goods, Latin America turned 
to the United States. While we may be able to explain satisfactorily 
to ourselves, and make excuses on the ground of necessity, it still 
remains a fact that during this period when our southern neighbors 
were compelled to buy almost exclusively from us, the prices they had 
to pay were the highest ever heard of and the terms demanded the 
shortest ever known, and with this all too often went short courtesy 
of speech and manner. We charged all the traffic would bear, and 
demanded cash or gave short credit. 

With the return of normal conditions, our European competitors will 
be back on the job with their usual far-sighted w^illingness to please the 
South American and meet his views. The average American house 
has a long way to travel before its service and the consideration it 
accords its foreign customers match those of European exporters. 

The prevalent belief in the minds of thousands of Latin Americans 
that the United States wilfully wronged Colombia — whether the belief be 
justified or not by the facts — created an almost insurmountable w^all of 
prejudice w^hich would have taken ma^iy years for American houses to 
live down not only in Colombia but elsewhere in Latin America, for the 
feeling had spread far. 

Fortunately many Colombians have felt almost from the beginning 
that the American people as a whole knew nothing of and w^ere not 
to blame for the Panama affair, and they are w^illing to forgive and 
forget the incident, now that a reasonable amount of justice has been 
accorded their country under the terms of the Treaty. 

It w^as right, from the standpoint of both justice and expediency, 
that this source of irritation and fear should be removed by the payment 
of a reasonable indemnity to Colombia. When w^e consider the proximity 
of Colombia to the United States — only half as far from her nothern 
ports to New York as to Europe — and that geographically and economi- 
cally we constitute the logical market for her products and the source 



from which she should supply her needs, it is clear that very neighborly 
relations should exist between the two countries. The payment of the 
indemnity opens the door for resumption of cordial relations, but it 
remains for the American business man to use tact and intelligence in 
cultivating the Colombian market. 

The $25,000,000 gives Colombia a borrowing pow^er of at least 
$100,000,000 w^hich she contemplates using in public works. This will 
open to the American manufacturer a new market for transportation 
and public utility supplies, and will result in a general stimulation of 
business within Colombia w^hich will be reflected in an increased demand 
for all commodities. 

There is an era of phenomenal deveIopm.ent ahead of Colombia, and 
the American manufacturer interested in the upbuilding of his export 
department on sound, constructive lines, will do w^ell to investigate 
thoroughly this market, and to make use of the present moment, w^hen 
export business generally is stagnant, to prepare for the proper handling 
of this rich territory. 



«P-2 8 



t^ 



COLOMBIAN COMMERCIAL CORPORATION 

56-58 Pine Street 
NEW YORK CITY 

TELEPHONE CABLE 

JOHN 0400 "COLOCOMCOR" 

Branches: BOGOTA and BARRANQUILLA. 
Agencies: MEDHLLIN, CARTAGENA and BUGARAMANGA 



— IVe are specialisti on Colombia — 

The personnel oj our New York 
Office is well informed on all Co- 
lombian matters and will welcome 
inquiries as to any phase of 
business there. 



Exports Imports 



Associate Engineers 

WOOD HULSE YATES CO., Inc. 




O . * c N »>- 










<^ "^^. 









^vP^^' 














■C?^ A 




















y \.*I<^"<v^ %-^^^,o^^ \*'°^-^'\v^ « -^ 



T O 
















; '^ ^"^ *'^ 

?* ,** *^ -.^K- / % -y 

' .0 













LIBRARY OF CONORpcc 

■■■■■ii 

0015840 721 8 



mm 



iiiip i 



'^«'n";!!illilltli| 







